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THE CURE IS WORSE: FIRST CIRCUIT 
CIRCUMVENTS FALSE CLAIMS ACT’S 
FIRST-TO-FILE RULE IN UNITED STATES 
EX REL. GADBOIS v. PHARMERICA CORP. 
Abstract: In 2015, in United States ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp., the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a qui tam relator could use 
supplementation to cure a jurisdictional first-to-file defect in a False Claims Act 
(“FCA”) action. In contrast, in 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria Healthcare Group, Inc. held 
that relators barred by first-to-file must face dismissal without prejudice and then 
refile if they are to proceed. Separately, in 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit in United States ex rel. Heath v. AT & T, Inc. held the first-to-file 
rule nonjurisdictional. This Comment argues that the Seventh and D.C. Circuits 
were correct. An approach that is inconsistent with either holding would contra-
vene the plain language of the first-to-file rule and the FCA’s structure. A refiling 
requirement also effectuates the FCA’s purpose because it promotes the prompt 
resolution of cases that are most likely to yield government recoveries. Adopting 
this requirement is critical to reining in an expansive qui tam regime. 
INTRODUCTION 
The False Claims Act (“FCA”) provides that private parties, called rela-
tors, may bring civil qui tam actions exposing fraud against the United States 
and collect a share of any resulting government recovery.1 By creating incen-
tives for whistleblowing, the qui tam provisions encourage the disclosure and 
prosecution of fraud against the United States.2 Proper qui tam claims must be 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012) (covering the entire text of the False 
Claims Act (“FCA”)). Liability under the FCA extends to any person who knowingly makes or bene-
fits from government payments acquired through intentional misrepresentation to the government. Id. 
§ 3729(a)(1). Relators who file qui tam suits on behalf of the government can be awarded as much as 
thirty percent of the government’s ultimate recovery. Id. § 3730(d)(2). The term qui tam comes from 
the Latin phrase “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,” which is translat-
ed in English to “who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.” Rockwell 
Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 463 n.2 (2007); see also United States v. Neifert-White 
Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232–33 (1968) (determining that the FCA was intended to make actionable any 
direct or indirect diversion of federal resources through any form of fraudulent claim); S. REP. NO. 99-
345, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5275 (noting that Congress included broad 
qui tam provisions when the FCA was first enacted in 1863). 
 2 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (laying out qui tam provisions); S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1–2, reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266–67 (explaining the purposes behind qui tam). When it amended the 
FCA in 1986, Congress emphasized the importance of reporting by private individuals with direct 
knowledge of fraud against the government in order to increase recoveries after citing to evidence 
44 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:E. Supp. 
based on facts of fraud not yet known to the government or publicly dis-
closed.3 The FCA’s first-to-file rule bars qui tam actions based on facts previ-
ously disclosed in an already pending action, thus preventing duplicative 
claims that do not provide new information to the government.4 
In 2015, in United States ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp. (“Gadbois 
II”), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit broke with the 
Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits when it conclud-
ed that the same qui tam case once barred by first-to-file could proceed after its 
first-filed counterpart had been dismissed.5 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit allowed the follow-on action to proceed on the grounds that a 
supplemental pleading reflecting the dismissal could cure the jurisdictional 
defect created by the first-to-file bar.6 In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit’s 2010 decision in United States ex rel. Chovanec v. 
Apria Healthcare Group Inc. (“Chovanec II”) held that the plain terms of the 
first-to-file rule restricted a follow-on action until it was refiled.7 
This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit correctly read first-to-file 
as requiring follow-on actions to be refiled before proceeding, and that this 
requirement best furthers the FCA’s purpose.8 This Comment also argues that 
                                                                                                                           
from polls showing that fraud was highly underreported under the then-existing qui tam regime. S. 
REP. NO. 99-345, at 4–5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269–70. 
 3 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B). 
 4 See id. § 3730(b)(5) (“When a person brings an action under this subsection, no person other 
than the government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending 
action.”); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that first-to-file is designed to curb duplicative allegations of fraud that do not provide new 
information to the government). 
 5 Compare United States ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp., 809 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(Gadbois II) (concluding that a qui tam action formerly barred by first-to-file could proceed after the 
dismissal of its first filed predecessor had been supplemented into the pleadings), cert. denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 2517 (2016), with United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 710 F.3d 171, 183 (4th Cir. 
2013) (Carter I) (concluding that second-filed case must be dismissed before proceeding), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part and remanded Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, 
135 S. Ct. 1970 (2015) (Carter II), United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria Healthcare Grp. Inc., 606 
F.3d 361, 362 (7th Cir. 2010) (Chovanec II) (concluding the same), and Grynberg v. Koch Gateway 
Pipeline Co., 390 F.3d 1276, 1278–79 (10th Cir. 2004) (same). 
 6 Gadbois II, 809 F.3d at 6. 
 7 Chovanec II, 606 F.3d at 362. Compare United States ex rel. Boise v. Cephalon, Inc., 159 F. 
Supp. 3d 550, 558 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (allowing a follow-on claim to proceed by way of amendment 
following the dismissal of its first-filed counterpart), with United States ex rel. Shea v. Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 3d 16, 30 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding that, once the first-to-file defect at-
tached to an action, it could not be cured until the action was dismissed without prejudice and refiled). 
 8 See Chovanec II, 606 F.3d at 362–64 (concluding that first-to-file’s prohibition on bringing an 
action mandates dismissal of that action, and noting that this prevents a build-up of follow-on cases); 
Shea, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 29–30 (finding that, by definition, a bar on actions cannot be cured by 
amending pleadings within those actions); Christopher M. Alexion, Note, Open the Door, Not the 
Floodgates: Controlling Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
365, 404, 406 (2012) (noting that a relator’s role is to provide information that increases government 
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the D.C. Circuit correctly defined first-to-file’s procedural character when it 
concluded that the rule was nonjurisdictional in its 2015 United States ex rel. 
Heath v. AT&T, Inc. decision.9 Part I of this Comment reviews the relevant 
legislative history of the FCA, the United States Supreme Court’s 2015 deci-
sion on first-to-file in Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States ex 
rel. Carter (“Carter II”), and the First Circuit’s Gadbois II decision.10 Part II 
explains the split between the First and Seventh Circuits as to the proper pro-
cedural fate of relators barred by first-to-file, and the D.C. Circuit’s characteri-
zation of the rule as nonjurisdictional.11 Part III concludes by arguing in favor 
of the D.C. Circuit’s characterization of the first-to-file rule as nonjurisdiction-
al, and the Seventh Circuit’s holding that an action barred by the rule must be 
refiled if it is to proceed.12 
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT’S QUI TAM 
PROVISIONS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF FIRST-TO-FILE  
IN CARTER II AND GADBOIS II 
In the FCA’s qui tam provisions, Congress created incentives for prompt, 
constructive whistleblowing while attempting to combat duplicative suits by 
using procedural safeguards such as first-to-file.13 Duplicative suits are seen as 
parasitic because they siphon financial and prosecutorial resources using in-
formation from host cases and do not independently further the discovery of 
                                                                                                                           
recoveries, and discussing the prevalence of duplicative, non-meritorious follow-on suits in an ex-
panded qui tam regime); infra notes 84–97 and accompanying text. 
 9 See United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 (2015) (opposing the characteriza-
tion of statutory rules as jurisdictional when the terms of those rules do not evince Congress’s intent to 
do so); United States ex rel. Heath v. AT&T, Inc., 791 F.3d 112, 119–21 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding 
that the first-to-file rule is nonjurisdictional after noting the absence of jurisdictional language in its 
terms, and the presence of that language in other sections of the FCA), cert. denied, AT&T, Inc. v. 
United States ex rel. Heath, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016); infra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 13–57 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 58–75 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 76–97 and accompanying text. 
 13 See David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui 
Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1273–74 (2012) (discussing first-to-file as one of a series 
of provisions in the FCA designed to weed out claims that rehash information already in the posses-
sion of—or accessible to—the government); see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40785, QUI TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 2–3 (2009) (indicat-
ing that the purposes of early qui tam provisions and the tensions inherent in them date back to their 
origins in early medieval England). The earliest cited whistleblower law, which provided that an in-
former to the crown could receive half of a Sabbath-breaker’s fine, illustrates an enduring incentive 
structure based on the value of such revelatory information to the government. DOYLE, supra, at 2. 
Modern qui tam tensions can also be traced back to the proliferation of whistleblower laws in medie-
val England that spawned a class of informants who tactically used and reused valuable information to 
their benefit. Cf. id. at 2–3 & n.13 (describing statutory safeguards that developed in response to op-
portunism, such as an eighteenth century rule forbidding copycat qui tam suits). 
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fraud.14 The Supreme Court has struggled to resolve tensions between the qui 
tam provisions that use incentives to invite whistleblowers with information 
about fraud and those designed to turn their potentially parasitic claims away.15 
Against this backdrop, Section A of this Part reviews the legislative history of 
the FCA, focusing on Congress’s evolving goals with regards to qui tam.16 
Section B of this Part then outlines the Supreme Court’s refutation of a restric-
tive interpretation of the first-to-file rule in Carter II.17 Finally, Section C of 
this Part details the First Circuit’s subsequent 2015 decision in Gadbois II, 
where the First Circuit devised a novel solution to a procedural issue affecting 
follow-on relators in the wake of Carter II.18 
A. The Historical Development of the FCA’s Qui Tam Provisions 
When originally enacted in 1863, the FCA was a blunt instrument de-
signed to curb Civil War contractor fraud by rewarding successful relators with 
half of the government’s recovery from a successful qui tam action.19 In 1943, 
Congress sought to prevent opportunistic abuses of this private enforcement 
scheme by passing amendments that gave the government more control over 
qui tam suits, proscribed actions based on information already available to the 
government, and limited the availability of recovery.20 
In 1986, Congress laid the groundwork for the rapid proliferation of qui 
tam suits when it amended the FCA in order to stimulate private enforce-
ment.21 Passed in response to reports of widespread fraud against the govern-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 
78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 558 (2000) (noting that the spread of “parasitical” lawsuits based on prior suc-
cessful FCA prosecutions spurred Congress to place restrictions on the qui tam provisions when it 
amended the FCA in 1943); see also Carter I, 710 F.3d at 181 (discussing the prevention of parasitic 
lawsuits as the purpose of first-to-file). 
 15 See Carter II, 135 S. Ct. at 1979 (indicating that the terms of the qui tam provisions are not 
always consonant with one another, and may lead to practical difficulties for parties involved in qui 
tam litigation). 
 16 See infra notes 19–29 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 30–37 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 38–57 and accompanying text. 
 19 See Act of March 2, 1863, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (laying out provisions of the original FCA); 
DOYLE, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing the purposes and breadth of the 1863 False Claims Act); Sean 
Elameto, Guarding the Guardians: Accountability in Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False 
Claims Act, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 813, 817 (2012) (same). 
 20 See Pub. L. No. 78-213, 57 Stat. 608 (1943) (enacting 1943 amendments to the FCA); DOYLE, 
supra note 13, at 6–7 (discussing 1943 amendments); Elameto, supra note 19, at 817–18 (noting that, 
between 1943 and 1986, an average of six qui tam cases were brought annually). 
 21 Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986) (enacting 1986 amendments to the FCA); S. REP. 
NO. 99-345, at 2, 24, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267, 5289 (discussing 1986 amend-
ments); Engstrom, supra note 13, at 1270–71 (same); see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIV., FRAUD 
STATISTICS—OVERVIEW (2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/796866/download [https://perma.cc/
VZ8K-EBTP] [hereinafter FRAUD STATISTICS] (showing a steady increase in qui tam litigation after 
1986); see also William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in Gov-
2017] First Circuit Circumvents False Claims Act First-to-File Bar 47 
ment, the 1986 amendments increased the financial incentives for relators and 
lowered procedural barriers that had halted almost all qui tam suits after 
1943.22 Congress continued to create additional avenues for bringing qui tam 
actions when it amended the FCA in 2009 and 2010.23 
Under the expanded qui tam regime, an average of over 650 actions were 
filed annually between 2011 and 2015, resulting in recoveries of roughly three 
billion dollars per year.24 As the plaintiff in a qui tam case, the bulk of these 
recoveries go to the government, whose sweeping discretionary power to con-
trol qui tam suits has not been limited by recent FCA amendments.25 Today’s 
                                                                                                                           
ernment Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1821 (1996) (noting that reports of government 
contractors defrauding the federal government spurred reforms to the FCA). Supporters of the 1986 
amendments believed that deputizing private relators to report fraud would reduce governmental over-
sight costs and connect enforcement agencies to those with direct knowledge of fraud. Kovacic, supra, 
at 1821–22. 
 22 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2) (providing that relators are to receive at least fifteen percent of the 
recovery from a successful qui tam action in which the government intervenes and up to thirty percent of 
the recovery if the government does not intervene); id. § 3730(c)(1) (allowing a private relator to contin-
ue to prosecute a qui tam action when the government intervenes); id. § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B) (allowing a 
relator to proceed in a suit based on information within the government’s possession prior to it being 
made public, and allowing a relator to proceed based on public information if relator is an “original 
source”); S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8, 23–24, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267, 5288–89 (dis-
cussing impetus behind amendments); see also Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 294–95 (2010) (noting that the 1986 amendments to the FCA sought 
to strike a balance between increasing reporting by relators with valuable new reports of fraud while 
quelling the claims of relators trading in stale information); DOYLE, supra note 13, at 6–7 (commenting 
on this schema). 
 23 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (triggering the FCA’s public disclosure bar when publicly dis-
closed information comes from federal proceedings in which the government was a party, from other 
federal sources, or from the media); Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (altering 
the FCA’s public disclosure bar in 2010); Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) (enacting 
2009 amendments to the FCA). Changes to the FCA’s public disclosure requirements in 2010 have 
made information from state court and other proceedings available, and allow relators to proceed on 
the basis of second-hand information about fraud. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. 
119 (laying out new requirements); DOYLE, supra note 13, at 8 (discussing 2009 amendments); Beverly 
Cohen, Kaboom! The Explosion of Qui Tam False Claims Under the Health Reform Law, 116 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 77, 89–90 (2011) (predicting that minor changes made to the FCA’s public disclosure bar 
in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act would set the stage for a flood of qui tam litigation); 
see also Engstrom, supra note 13, at 1274 n.104 (noting that 2010 amendments lowered the public 
disclosure bar’s threshold and that, even after a court has imposed the bar, the DOJ can still allow a 
relator’s case to proceed). 
 24 See FRAUD STATISTICS, supra note 21 (compiling data on qui tam suits); Kovacic, supra note 
21, at 1801–03 (indicating an average of only sixty-one qui tam suits filed annually between 1987 and 
1995, and discussing the likelihood of an increase in qui tam litigation due in part to increased publici-
ty and specialization of the plaintiff’s bar); see also Kathleen Clark & Nancy J. Moore, Financial 
Rewards for Whistleblowing Lawyers, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (2015) (noting that the success of 
qui tam in combating fraud against the government supported the creation of similar financial incen-
tives for whistleblowers to report securities violations under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)). 
 25 See Engstrom, supra note 13, at 1272–73 (discussing the government’s qui tam involvement 
prerogatives). 
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FCA allows the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to take partial or complete con-
trol of qui tam litigation.26 Among other powers, the government has almost 
complete discretion to extinguish a qui tam claim immediately and to settle 
with a defendant, even in the face of opposition from a relator.27 
Added to the FCA in 1986, first-to-file is employed after the government 
declines to intervene in or dismiss a qui tam action, and a defendant seeks dis-
missal by pointing to allegations of fraud that it contends are similar to those 
contained in another pending case.28 Judicial construction of the rule has far-
reaching consequences for the government, relators, and defendants because, 
as a procedural roadblock, first-to-file stands to impede an entire subset of pri-
vately litigated qui tam claims.29 
B. Supreme Court Addresses the Breadth of First-to-File Bar in Carter II 
In the context of today’s expanded FCA, the Supreme Court’s 2015 deci-
sion in Carter II rejected a restrictive interpretation of the first-to-file rule by 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Engstrom, supra note 13, at 1271–72. At the outset of qui tam litigation, the government has at 
least sixty days to evaluate a newly-filed complaint under seal, during which time it can elect to assert 
its control over a relator’s action. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4). When the government intervenes in a qui 
tam action, it is statutorily obligated to manage its prosecution. Id. § 3730(c)(1). The current private 
prosecution mechanism was added in 1986 to counteract the desuetude of the FCA and to spur DOJ 
enforcement by encouraging private suits that, if successful, would reduce the government’s portion 
of the recovery. See Engstrom, supra note 13, at 1273 & n.100 (discussing the purposes of the private 
prosecution provision as related to the 1986 amendments). 
 27 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)–(B). 
 28 Id. § 3730(b)(5), (c)(3), (d)(2); Gadbois II, 809 F.3d at 3; see S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 25, re-
printed in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5290 (noting that first-to-file was added to the FCA to prevent 
separate factually identical actions and class actions from being brought through the private prosecu-
tion mechanism). Legislative history regarding first-to-file discusses actions based on “identical facts” 
as barred by the rule. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 25, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5290. When 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Grynberg v. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co. in 2010 looked to the 
similarity of “material elements” to determine whether an action was related to a prior suit, it ex-
plained that courts have never employed a narrow “identical facts” test because the FCA expressly 
refers to “related” actions. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5); Grynberg, 390 F.3d at 1279. The court further 
concluded that a narrow test based on identical facts would contravene the objective of first-to-file, 
reasoning that “[o]nce the government is put on notice of its potential fraud claim, the purpose behind 
allowing qui tam litigation is satisfied.” Grynberg, 390 F.3d at 1279. Although first-to-file was codi-
fied in the FCA in 1986, it had previously been employed by federal courts as a matter of common 
law derived from the English tradition dating back at least to the Eighteenth Century. See United 
States ex rel. Benjamin v. Hendrick, 52 F. Supp. 60, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (relying on Blackstone’s 
Commentaries and stating as settled that a qui tam action is barred when it has the same identity as an 
action already commenced by the government). Blackstone stated a first-to-file analogue as follows: 
“if any one hath begun a qui tam . . . action, no other person can pursue it; and the verdict passed upon 
the defendant in the first suit is a bar to all others, and conclusive even to the king himself.” 3 WIL-
LIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160. 
 29 See Recent Case, False Claims Act: D.C. Circuit Holds That False Claims Act First-to-File 
Rule Is Nonjurisdictional, 129 HARV. L. REV. 574, 577 (2015) (noting the prevalence of first-to-file 
litigation). 
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giving effect to the rule’s plain terms.30 The Court was presented with the 
question of whether the first-to-file rule could continue to bar follow-on qui 
tam relators after an underlying “pending” action was dismissed.31 The Court 
determined that allowing abandoned FCA suits to foreclose the possibility of 
government recovery in later related actions was contrary to Congress’s in-
tent.32 Relying on the commonly accepted meaning of the term pending, the 
Court held that, after a qui tam action was dismissed, it could no longer bar 
related actions.33 The Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit in holding that a fol-
low-on relator’s case should have been dismissed under first-to-file without 
prejudice, thereby allowing it to be refiled and proceed anew.34 
The Carter II Court noted that its ruling had not resolved lingering inter-
pretive difficulties present in the qui tam provisions, and that the ruling could 
make defendants less likely to settle with the government given the possible 
increase in follow-on suits.35 One issue not addressed in Carter II was the pro-
cedural fate of follow-on qui tam actions that are still in progress when a pend-
ing action that once barred them is dismissed.36 The First Circuit addressed 
that issue for the first time in the wake of Carter II.37 
C. First Circuit Resuscitates Follow-On Qui Tam Action in  
Gadbois v. PharMerica 
In 2010, Robert Gadbois worked as a staff pharmacist in Rhode Island for 
PharMerica Corporation (“PharMerica”).38 That year, Gadbois commenced a 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Carter II, 135 S. Ct. at 1979. 
 31 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5); Carter II, 135 S. Ct. at 1978–79. 
 32 Carter II, 135 S. Ct. at 1979. The Court’s statement that the first-to-file rule should not unnec-
essarily bar follow-on actions has been used to curtail interpretive attempts to increase the breadth of 
first-to-file. See United States ex rel. Saldivar v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 3d 
1311, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (rejecting a broad definition of “pending action”), rev’d, 841 F.3d 927 
(11th Cir. 2016); Brief in Opposition at 1–2, PharMerica Corp. v. United States ex rel. Gadbois, No. 
15-1309 (U.S. May 23, 2016), 2016 WL 3014495, at *1–2 (arguing that Congress would not want 
first-to-file and the FCA’s statute of limitations to double-bar potentially valuable qui tam claims). 
 33 Carter II, 135 S. Ct. at 1979. The court referred to a dictionary definition of the term “pend-
ing,” and concluded that, as used in § 3730(b)(5), the term referred to cases that were still on the 
docket but—according to common sense—not those that had been dismissed. Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id.; see Rogers v. Ferriter, 796 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir. 2015) (referencing exposure to con-
tinuous qui tam suits as a difficulty faced by defendants in light of Carter II); see also Carter II, 135 
S. Ct. at 1979 (noting that claim preclusion may bar actions that are filed after first-to-file no longer 
applies when an action alleging the same fraud has already been resolved on the merits). 
 36 See Gadbois II, 809 F.3d at 3–4 (noting that this issue had arisen when a relator’s first-filed 
counterpart was dismissed shortly after Carter II was decided). 
 37 Id. 
 38 United States ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp., No. 10-471, 2014 BL 462369, at *2 (D.R.I. 
Oct. 3, 2014) (Gadbois I). The pharmacy where Gadbois worked was one of a network of approxi-
mately ninety-one owned and operated by PharMerica in forty-five states. Id. at *1. PharMerica filled 
50 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:E. Supp. 
qui tam action against his employer in Rhode Island federal district court, fil-
ing a complaint under seal on behalf of himself, the United States, and twenty-
two individual states.39 In his complaint, Gadbois alleged, inter alia, that 
PharMerica had profited from overbilling Medicaid and Medicare Part D for 
prescription medications, in violation of the FCA.40 
After the government declined to intervene in Gadbois’s action, PharMeri-
ca received his unsealed complaint and moved to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction based on first-to-file.41 PharMerica argued that Gadbois’s 
action lacked jurisdiction because it was filed while a related action was pend-
ing in Wisconsin.42 The Wisconsin qui tam action against PharMerica had been 
filed by another pharmacist named Jennifer Denk over one year before Gad-
bois commenced litigation.43 Gadbois argued that the two actions were not re-
lated because he had alleged a scheme involving controlled and non-controlled 
substances, whereas Denk’s allegations involved only controlled substances.44 
Comparing the two sets of allegations, the district court reasoned that 
Gadbois had raised a distinction without a difference as to the essential or ma-
terial facts alleged in the two actions that otherwise described similar fraudu-
lent practices and victims.45 Accordingly, the court found that Denk’s action 
was the first to alert the government to the essential facts of a PharMerica 
scheme to overbill Medicare and Medicaid for prescription drugs.46 Holding 
that Denk was the first-filer and that Gadbois’s action was therefore barred, the 
district court dismissed his case.47 
On appeal, the First Circuit held that Gadbois could cure the first-to-file 
defect in his qui tam action by filing a supplemental pleading.48 In so holding, 
the court deemed dispositive two intervening events that occurred while Gad-
bois’s appeal was briefed that caused the case to take on a novel procedural 
posture.49 First, the Supreme Court had held in Carter II that, once dismissed, 
a case was no longer “pending,” meaning that it could no longer bar follow-on 
                                                                                                                           
approximately forty million prescriptions annually between 2007 and 2009. United States ex rel. Buth 
v. PharMerica Corp., No. 9-720, 2014 WL 4355342, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 3, 2014). 
 39 Gadbois I, 2014 BL 462369, at *1. 
 40 Id. at *1–2. 
 41 Id. at *1–2, *8. 
 42 Id. at *8–9. 
 43 Id. at *9. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at *9–10. 
 46 Id. Moreover, the court noted that Denk had been involved in a federal investigation of PharMeri-
ca, that her action had been consolidated with another action in Florida, and that it had moved past a 
motion to dismiss after the United States intervened. Id. at *5–6, *9-10. 
 47 Id. at *10. 
 48 Gadbois II, 809 F.3d at 6. 
 49 Id. at 4, 6. 
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actions through first-to-file.50 Second, Denk’s case was dismissed after the 
government settled with PharMerica.51 
The First Circuit decided that Gadbois could proceed after supplementing 
his pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d).52 To reach this con-
clusion, the First Circuit started with the premise that the first-to-file rule was 
jurisdictional.53 It then reasoned that, if the rule had previously rendered Gad-
bois’s action jurisdictionally defective, he ought to be able to cure the defect 
by supplementing his complaint with new facts.54 After examining Rule 15(d), 
the court determined that the Rule could serve an efficient, curative function 
with regards to certain defects of subject matter jurisdiction, including first-to-
file.55 
According to the First Circuit, PharMerica’s proposed procedural route of 
refiling would have been pointlessly inefficient and based only on an unneces-
sary adherence to the rule that jurisdiction is set in stone at the time that an 
original complaint is filed.56 The court determined that a time-of-filing rule 
had limited application in the federal question context, and that proceeding 
through supplementation would spare Gadbois from having to recommence his 
case.57 
                                                                                                                           
 50 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5); Carter II, 135 S. Ct. at 1979; Gadbois II, 809 F.3d at 6. 
 51 Gadbois II, 809 F.3d at 6. PharMerica reached a $31.5 million settlement with the government in 
Denk’s case, of which she received a $4.3 million share. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Long-Term 
Care Pharmacy to Pay $31.5 Million to Settle Lawsuit Alleging Violations of Controlled Substances Act 
and False Claims Act (May 14, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/long-term-care-pharmacy-pay-
315-million-settle-lawsuit-alleging-violations-controlled [https://perma.cc/T9GM-QSW8]. 
 52 Gadbois II, 809 F.3d at 6. The court remanded his motion to supplement to the district court. 
Id. at 7–8. Subject to the court’s discretion, Rule 15(d) allows for occurrences subsequent to the filing 
of a complaint to be reflected therein and, by virtue of a 1963 addition to the Rule, it can serve as a 
means for rectifying errors that barred a complaint from proceeding. FED. R. CIV. P. 15 advisory 
committee’s note to 1963 amendment. The 1963 addition was made in part to remedy the inefficient 
judicial practice of holding parties to their defective pleadings. Id. 
 53 Gadbois II, 809 F.3d at 3, 6. 
 54 Id. at 6. 
 55 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d); Gadbois II, 809 F.3d at 5–6. In 1976, in Mathews v. Diaz, the Supreme 
Court indicated that a defect of subject matter jurisdiction caused by a failure to file an application for 
federal benefits could be cured under Rule 15(d). 426 U.S. 67, 75 (1976). The First Circuit determined 
that Mathews and related Courts of Appeals cases illustrated that the time-of-filing rule should not be 
applied rigidly to dismiss jurisdictionally defective cases in the manner that the 1963 addition to Rule 
15(d) was designed to prevent. Gadbois II, 809 F.3d at 5 (citing Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. 
Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 198 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
 56 Gadbois II, 809 F.3d at 5–6. See generally Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 
567, 570–71 (2004) (citing Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824)) (noting that the 
time-of-filing rule requires the propriety of subject matter jurisdiction to be determined based on facts 
that existed when an action was filed). 
 57 Gadbois II, 809 F.3d at 5–6. In 2004, in Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., the Su-
preme Court squarely revisited the traditional time-of-filing rule. 541 U.S. at 574–75. The Court con-
cluded that exceptions to the rule would encourage dismissed parties to engage in litigation over the 
jurisdictional dismissal itself, as opposed to proceeding with new actions. Id. at 582. 
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II. CIRCUITS IN CONFLICT OVER THE PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS  
OF THE FCA’S FIRST-TO-FILE RULE 
The FCA does not directly address the fate of an action that is still on the 
docket when a first-filed counterpart has been dismissed, ostensibly lifting the 
first-to-file bar.58 That issue raises the question of whether a barred follow-on 
action must forever be defined as a defective “related action” for the purposes 
of first-to-file, even following the dismissal of the first-filed case that was ini-
tially a disqualifier.59 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s 2015 
decision in United States ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp. (“Gadbois II”) 
did not directly address that definitional question when it allowed a relator to 
proceed with the same action that had once been barred by first-to-file, con-
cluding that the rule’s jurisdictional bar could be lifted by way of a supple-
mental pleading.60 Section A of this Part briefly examines the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s 2015 decision in United States ex rel. Heath v. 
AT&T, Inc. that concluded that the first-to-file rule is nonjurisdictional.61 Sec-
tion B of this Part details the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s 
2010 decision in United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria Healthcare Group, 
Inc. (“Chovanec II”), in which the court concluded that a related action is al-
ways impermissible under first-to-file and must be refiled to proceed.62 
A. D.C. Circuit: First-to-File Is Nonjurisdictional 
In 2015, in Gadbois II, the First Circuit articulated the generally accepted 
view of the first-to-file rule as jurisdictional in nature.63 Indeed, the court’s 
inquiry in Gadbois II dealt primarily with the question of whether a qui tam 
action that once lacked subject matter jurisdiction under first-to-file could ac-
quire jurisdiction and proceed.64 The D.C. Circuit’s prior 2015 decision in 
                                                                                                                           
 58 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2012); see United States v. Cephalon, Inc., 159 F. 
Supp. 3d 550, 558 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (noting that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of first-to-file in 
Carter II did not resolve this issue). 
 59 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5); see United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria Healthcare Grp. Inc., 606 
F.3d 361, 362 (7th Cir. 2010) (Chovanec II) (addressing this question). 
 60 See United States ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp., 809 F.3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 2015) (Gad-
bois II) (alluding to this issue of statutory interpretation but not addressing it in detail), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 2517 (2016). 
 61 See infra notes 63–68 and accompanying text. 
 62 See infra notes 69–75 and accompanying text. 
 63 See Gadbois II, 809 F.3d at 6; Recent Case, supra note 29, at 575 n.23 (noting that courts hold-
ing the consensus view of the first-to-file rule as jurisdictional in nature accepted this characterization 
of the rule without probing it); see, e.g., United States ex rel. Ven-A-Care of the Fla. Keys, Inc. v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 772 F.3d 932, 936 (1st Cir. 2014) (stating as settled that the first-to-file rule 
is jurisdictional). 
 64 Gadbois II, 809 F.3d at 5–6. 
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Heath  was the first to consider, and ultimately attempt to refute, the character-
ization of the first-to-file rule as jurisdictional.65 
The Heath court held that application of the first-to-file rule indicates that a 
relator has failed to state a claim, not that a court lacks jurisdiction to hear the 
relator’s case.66 In so holding, the court noted the Supreme Court’s unwilling-
ness to characterize rules as jurisdictional when Congress had not explicitly la-
beled them as such, given the ramifications for courts and litigants.67 The Heath 
court further noted that first-to-file referred only to when a case could be 
brought, unlike other FCA restrictions that spoke in explicitly jurisdictional 
terms.68 
B. Seventh Circuit: Actions Barred by First-to-File Cannot Be Stayed 
Without addressing whether first-to-file was jurisdictional, the Seventh 
Circuit in Chovanec II held that a follow-on qui tam action could not be stayed 
pending the dismissal of a first-filed case, according to the plain terms of the 
rule.69 In its 2005 United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria Healthcare Group 
Inc. decision, the District Court of the Northern District of Illinois initially 
dismissed the relator’s case after the court found that it was related to two 
                                                                                                                           
 65 791 F.3d 112, 120–21 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, AT&T, Inc. v. United States ex rel. 
Heath, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016). 
 66 Id. at 121. After concluding that first-to-file was nonjurisdictional, the court gave the rule a 
default characterization as bearing on the statement of a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6). Id. at 120–21. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Grynberg v. Koch Gate-
way Pipeline Co. provided an explanation for this characterization of first-to-file. 390 F.3d 1276, 1278 
n.1 (10th Cir. 2004). In choosing to dismiss a follow-on qui tam claim under Rule 12(b)(6), that court 
eschewed the characterization of a motion invoking the first-to-file bar as one for summary judgment 
under Rule 56 or, alternatively, as one for jurisdictional dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). Id. The court 
concluded that Rule 12(b)(1) was improper after determining that first-to-file operated to bar a claim 
based on lack of jurisdiction and lack of merit. Id. The court concluded that Rule 56 was improper 
because first-to-file required dismissal based purely on the allegations initially set forth in a qui tam 
claim. Id. 
 67 Heath, 791 F.3d at 119–20; see, e.g., United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 
(2015) (declining to construe a procedural requirement in a statute as jurisdictional when there was no 
clear congressional intent to that effect); Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013) 
(same); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 140 (2012) (same); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 
514–15 (2006) (same). Chief among these ramifications is the obligation on the part of the court to 
dismiss a claim whenever a jurisdictional defect is discovered. Recent Case, supra note 29, at 577–78. 
 68 Heath, 791 F.3d at 120–21; see also Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 467–
68 (2007) (concluding that the FCA’s pre-2010 amendment public disclosure bar was jurisdictional 
because it expressly deprived courts of jurisdiction). Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (“When a per-
son brings an action under this subsection, no person other than the government may intervene or 
bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending action.”), with id. § 3730(e)(1) (em-
ploying jurisdictional language to create a bar against certain actions by members of the armed ser-
vices), and id. § 3730(e)(2)(A) (using the language “no court shall have jurisdiction” when creating a 
bar to actions against certain government and judicial officials when the government has knowledge 
of the information upon which those actions are based). 
 69 Chovanec II, 606 F.3d at 362–63. 
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pending cases.70 Following the combined settlement of both earlier-filed cases 
shortly thereafter, the relator unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the 
dismissal on grounds that the settlement had lifted the first-to-file bar.71 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that bringing a first-filed case was a 
“condition precedent” to proceeding with qui tam litigation because of the 
rule’s unambiguous prohibition on “bring[ing] a related action” during the 
pendency of a related predecessor.72 The court reasoned that any follow-on 
action was perpetually defective because it had not satisfied this condition.73 
The court further indicated that permitting follow-on relators to wait on the 
docket would frustrate the rule’s goal of impeding duplicative cases.74 Accord-
ingly, the court construed first-to-file as a rule designed to create a one-person 
entryway for private relators to sue, without room for follow-on relators to 
stand by.75 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. at 362; United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria Healthcare Grp. Inc., No. 04-4543, at 4–5 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2005) (Chovanec I). 
 71 Chovanec II, 606 F.3d at 362–63; Order on Motion for Reconsideration at 1–2, Chovanec I, 
No. 04–4543 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2006). 
 72 Chovanec II, 606 F.3d at 362–63 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)). In 1989, in Hallstrom v. 
Tillamook County, the Supreme Court defined a similar bar to lawsuits in an environmental statute’s 
administrative exhaustion requirement. 493 U.S. 20, 32–33 (1989). Referencing language of the stat-
ute stating “[n]o action may be commenced,” as well as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 that defines 
an action as beginning with a complaint, the Court reasoned that permitting a stay would plainly con-
travene the intent of the statutory bar. FED. R. CIV. P. 3; Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 25–26. Moreover, 
Hallstrom referred to the complaint as barred in perpetuity by virtue of the fact that it had not met a 
“condition precedent” contained in the statute. 493 U.S. at 25–26. The Court determined that the ques-
tion whether the administrative exhaustion defect at issue was jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional raised 
a distinction without a difference to its analysis after it concluded that the mandatory requirement 
barred a defective action from ever proceeding. Id. at 30–31. Accordingly, the Court declined to de-
fine the requirement as jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional. Id. The Seventh Circuit in Chovanec II 
relied directly on Hallstrom’s administrative exhaustion analysis, whereas the District Court of the 
Eastern District of Virginia in United States ex rel. Soodavar v. Unisys Corp. distinguished first-to-
file’s purpose from that of an administrative exhaustion requirement. Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 25–26; 
Chovanec II, 606 F.3d at 362–63; United States ex rel. Soodavar v. Unisys Corp., 178 F. Supp. 3d 
358, 373 (E.D. Va. 2016). The Eastern District of Virginia concluded that a rule allowing a plaintiff to 
overcome an administrative exhaustion bar did not suggest by analogy that a relator should be allowed 
to overcome the first-to-file bar. Unisys Corp., 178 F. Supp. 3d at 373. The court reasoned that, 
whereas exhaustion bars were intended to further the efficient resolution of suits—a purpose that 
might be served by allowing a once-barred case to proceed—the first-to-file bar could not be similarly 
bypassed because the rule was specifically intended to block duplicative suits. Id. at 373–74. 
 73 Chovanec II, 606 F.3d at 362. Following Heath, the District Court of the District of Columbia 
in United States ex rel. Shea v. Verizon Communications, Inc. proceeded under the premise that the 
first-to-file rule was nonjurisdictional and expanded on Chovanec II when it determined that a related 
action could not proceed, irrespective of whether pleadings within that action had been updated with 
new facts, because the pleadings would still be part of a prohibited action. 160 F. Supp. 3d 16, 28–30 
(D.D.C. 2015). 
 74 See Chovanec II, 606 F.3d at 362 (noting the potential for endless cascading of follow-on cas-
es). 
 75 Id. The Fourth and Tenth Circuits similarly concluded that an action, once barred by first-to-
file, cannot proceed until it is refiled. United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 710 F.3d 171, 
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III. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT’S FIRST-TO-FILE BAR IS A 
NONJURISDICTIONAL DEFECT THAT CANNOT BE CURED 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s 2015 decision in United 
States ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp. (“Gadbois II”) erroneously held 
that the FCA’s first-to-file rule imposed a jurisdictional bar that could be lifted 
through supplemental pleading.76 First, this Part argues that the text of first-to-
file and the structure of the qui tam provisions demonstrate that the rule is non-
jurisdictional.77 Next, this Part argues that the text of first-to-file plainly cre-
ates a perpetual bar on an action that can only be lifted by way of refiling.78 
Finally, this Part argues that a refiling requirement best serves the FCA’s pur-
pose of increasing government recoveries.79 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit correctly interpreted first-
to-file in its 2015 United States ex rel. Heath v. AT & T, Inc. decision when it 
concluded that suits barred by the rule fail to state a claim, as opposed to lack-
ing subject matter jurisdiction.80 Containing no reference to jurisdiction, the 
                                                                                                                           
183 (4th Cir. 2013) (Carter I), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded Kellogg Brown & Root 
Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970 (2015) (Carter II); Grynberg, 390 F.3d at 
1278–79. Both courts reached this conclusion after determining—without detailed analysis—that the 
first-to-file inquiry is confined to the facts in existence when a related action was filed. Carter I, 710 
F.3d at 183; Grynberg, 390 F.3d at 1278–79. 
 76 See 809 F.3d 1, 6–7, 6 n.2 (1st Cir. 2015) (Gadbois II) (declining to examine the jurisdictional 
or plain language issues), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2517 (2016). 
 77 See United States ex rel. Heath v. AT & T, Inc., 791 F.3d 112, 119–21 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (con-
cluding that first-to-file is nonjurisdictional based on terms of the rule and its context within the FCA), 
cert. denied, AT&T, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016); Recent Case, supra 
note 29, at 576 (indicating Heath’s logical consistency and coherence to recent Supreme Court prece-
dent regarding overuse of jurisdictional characterizations); infra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
 78 See United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria Healthcare Grp. Inc., 606 F.3d 361, 362–63 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (Chovanec II) (concluding based on the terms of first-to-file that bringing an action while 
no related action is pending is a pre-condition for relators to proceed with suits); United States ex rel. 
Soodavar v. Unisys Corp., 178 F. Supp. 3d 358, 373 (E.D. Va. 2016) (concluding that the language of 
first-to-file as well as the congressional purpose behind the rule mandate the dismissal of a related 
action); United States ex rel. Shea v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 3d 16, 29–30 (D.D.C. 
2015) (finding that a follow-on action will always have been brought while a related action was pend-
ing such that later-filed supplemental pleadings cannot remove the first-to-file bar); infra notes 84–92 
and accompanying text. 
 79 See Carter II, 135 S. Ct. at 1979 (noting defendant disinclination to settle when faced with the 
possibility of follow-on qui tam actions); Chovanec II, 606 F.3d at 362, 364 (noting that staying ac-
tions pending the dismissal of their first-filed counterparts would controvert the purpose of the rule by 
incentivizing relators to ceaselessly file follow-on actions); Elameto, supra note 19, at 826 (noting the 
historically low success rate of qui tam cases in which the government did not intervene); infra notes 
93–97 and accompanying text. 
 80 See 791 F.3d at 120–21. As a means of avoiding the traditional time-of-filing rule that applies 
to jurisdictional requirements, Gadbois argued that under Heath, the first-to-file rule was nonjurisdic-
tional. Gadbois II, 809 F.3d at 6 n.2. In response, the First Circuit noted the holding in Heath but 
explicitly did not reach the question of whether first-to-file was jurisdictional, although it treated the 
rule as such. Id. In 2015, in Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter 
(“Carter II”), the Supreme Court also did not reach the jurisdictional question, but the manner in 
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text of the rule supports the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Heath rather than the 
First Circuit’s contrary assumption in Gadbois II.81 Additionally, the FCA con-
tains restrictions other than first-to-file that speak in jurisdictional terms, indi-
cating that Congress made its intent to create jurisdictional rules explicit in the 
FCA.82 Lastly, this characterization of first-to-file follows the Supreme Court’s 
repeated directives against treating statutory rules as jurisdictional absent un-
ambiguous congressional intent.83 
Proceeding under the premise that first-to-file is nonjurisdictional, the 
statutory restriction that the rule articulates determines whether a follow-on 
relator is eligible to proceed by way of supplementation.84 Under the plain lan-
guage of first-to-file, a relator is barred from “bring[ing] a related action.”85 
The fact of the related action having been brought constitutes a violation of the 
                                                                                                                           
which the Court raised first-to-file and the fact that it never described the rule in jurisdictional terms 
suggest that it did not treat first-to-file as jurisdictional. See 135 S. Ct. at 1978–79 (referring to the 
first-to-file bar without using jurisdictional language or implying a court’s lack of power to hear a 
barred case); Heath, 791 F.3d at 121 n.4 (noting that Carter II addressed first-to-file after addressing a 
separate nonjurisdictional issue). 
 81 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2012). Compare Gadbois II, 809 F.3d at 6–7, 6 n.2 
(deeming first-to-file’s jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional character irrelevant to the court’s disposition 
after holding that a relator cured a jurisdictional defect through supplementation and implying that 
relator thereby cured any nonjurisdictional defect), with Heath, 791 F.3d at 120, 123 (examining the 
text of first-to-file in the context of the FCA and reaching the conclusion that the rule was nonjurisdic-
tional although this conclusion was not necessary to the court’s disposition that first-to-file did not 
apply because a putative-related action was materially distinct from its earlier-filed counterpart). 
 82 Heath, 791 F.3d at 120–21; see 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(2)(A) (using jurisdictional terms). 
 83 See, e.g., United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1638 (2015) (holding that a statute 
of limitations bar was nonjurisdictional where the relevant statutory provision used the language 
“shall be forever barred”); Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 828–29 (2013) (hold-
ing that a statutory deadline for administrative appeals was nonjurisdictional); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 
U.S. 134, 154 (2012) (holding that a federal habeas appeal requirement was compulsory in nature but 
nonjurisdictional); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514–16 (2006) (holding that a Title VII 
requirement for threshold numbers of employees was nonjurisdictional after comparing it to explicitly 
jurisdictional amount-in-controversy and diversity-of-citizenship rules); see also Recent Case, supra 
note 29, at 579–80 (indicating that a nonjurisdictional first-to-file rule limits opportunities for defend-
ants to dismiss qui tam suits, may allow for equitable relief, and could generally benefit relators by 
limiting first-to-file’s application). 
 84 See Chovanec II, 606 F.3d at 362 (beginning analysis into question of whether action must be 
dismissed under first-to-file by addressing plain language of the rule); see also Hallstrom v. Tillamook 
Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 25, 31 (1989) (noting established principle that interpretation of a statute properly 
begins with its plain terms and then adhering to the conventional practice of dismissing actions that 
are plainly barred by statute); Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6, 9 (2008) (not-
ing that the terms of nonjurisdictional rules can make them operate with the force of jurisdictional 
rules in many respects, such as by foreclosing equitable exceptions). 
 85 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). 
2017] First Circuit Circumvents False Claims Act First-to-File Bar 57 
rule.86 Accordingly, a related action is forever prohibited, because it will al-
ways have been brought impermissibly.87 
When the First Circuit in Gadbois II held that a once-barred relator could 
proceed by way of supplementation, the court glossed over first-to-file’s terms 
and implicitly treated the rule as bearing on pleadings as opposed to actions.88 
By definition, the term “action” refers to an entire case, of which a pleading is 
a part.89 If first-to-file barred a related pleading within an action, then supple-
mentation of newly-pleaded facts could serve to cure the defective pleading 
and allow the action to proceed.90 First-to-file, however, plainly places a bar on 
actions.91 The First Circuit’s holding failed to acknowledge that a relator can-
not overcome first-to-file by supplementing the pleadings within an action that 
is prohibited in toto for not having satisfied the rule.92 
Whereas the First Circuit’s approach streamlined litigation for follow-on 
relators, a refiling requirement promotes the resolution of cases that are likely 
to be most valuable to the government—the plaintiff in qui tam litigation.93 
When the government does not intervene in follow-on qui tam actions—
thereby subjecting them to first-to-file—settlements are far less likely.94 More-
                                                                                                                           
 86 Chovanec II, 606 F.3d at 362; Shea, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 30. 
 87 Chovanec II, 606 F.3d at 362; Shea, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 30; see Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 
666 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that, by definition, the dismissal of an action is final whereas the dismis-
sal of a complaint can be remedied by way of supplementation or amendment). 
 88 See Gadbois II, 809 F.3d at 5–6 (treating first-to-file as a rule that renders pleadings defective 
without addressing statutory language or explaining the mechanism through which a supplemented 
pleading can overcome the rule’s prohibition on actions); Shea, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 30 (noting that 
post-filing changes made to pleadings are not capable of addressing the barrier that first-to-file erects 
against entire actions). 
 89 See FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (providing that actions begin with complaints); Shea, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 
30 (explaining that changes to complaints occur within the context of an action as it proceeds through 
litigation whereas a prohibition on an action works to stop litigation altogether). 
 90 See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d) (providing that supplementation can incorporate new facts to cure 
defective pleadings); FED. R. CIV. P. 15 advisory committee’s note to 1963 amendment (noting that 
Rule 15(d) works to promote fairness and efficiency by preventing parties from being held to their 
original, defective pleadings). But see Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 983 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting 
that Rule 15(d) should not allow a pleading defect to be cured if doing so would contravene the pur-
pose of a statutory restriction). 
 91 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5); Chovanec II, 606 F.3d at 362; Shea, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 30. 
 92 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5); Chovanec II, 606 F.3d at 362; Shea, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 30; see Gad-
bois II, 809 F.3d at 6 (holding that a first-to-file defect can be cured by supplementing facts in plead-
ings). 
 93 See Engstrom, supra note 13, at 1274 (noting that the qui tam provisions specifically aim to 
limit duplicative cases with no new information to offer to the government); Alexion, supra note 8, at 
405–06 (explaining that rewards for relators under qui tam are meant to hinge on the revelation of 
information that uncovers new instances of fraud). 
 94 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), (c)(3) (allowing the government to bring related action and allow-
ing a private party to proceed if the government declines to intervene, at which point the first-to-file 
bar applies); FRAUD STATISTICS, supra note 21 (collecting data from 1987 through 2015 showing that 
total recoveries from government-intervention actions are roughly fifteen times greater than those 
from private actions, although private recoveries saw a large, unprecedented spike in 2015); David 
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over, incentivizing these follow-on cases to stay on the docket has the potential 
to reduce government recoveries, hamper DOJ prosecutions, and make defend-
ants less willing to settle first-filed cases out of lack of finality concerns.95 In 
contrast, a mandatory first-to-file dismissal would clear the docket of follow-
on suits while a first-filed case is litigated and then would give the government 
a second opportunity to intervene upon refiling.96 Finally, the requirement in-
centivizes prompt reporting on fraud because it increases the putative value of 
a first-filed claim.97 
                                                                                                                           
Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: Empirical Analysis of DOJ Oversight 
of Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1689, 1719–20 (2013) (col-
lecting data from 1986 through 2011 showing that recoveries resulted in ninety percent of govern-
ment-intervention cases but the inverse was true of private qui tam actions). Government-intervention 
cases produced ninety-seven percent of qui tam recoveries from 1987 through 2010. Elameto, supra 
note 19, at 826. During that time, the government intervened in roughly one-fifth of all qui tam cases, 
with a five percent dismissal rate, as compared to an eighty-five percent dismissal rate for qui tam 
suits in which the government declined to intervene. Id. 
 95 See Chovanec II, 606 F.3d at 362, 364 (determining that allowing a stay pending a first-to-file 
dismissal creates the potential for follow-on relators to queue up endlessly on the docket, and noting 
potential for duplicative suits to siphon government recoveries to relators); H.R. REP. NO. 111-97, at 
28 (2009) (arguing that private qui tam actions generally hinder DOJ prosecution efforts in light the 
fact that the greatly-increased volume of private qui tam actions had only accounted for three percent 
of total government recoveries between 1986 and 2009); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4, 18, 
PharMerica Corp. v. United States ex rel. Gadbois, No. 15-1309 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2016) (noting lowered 
settlement prospects when follow-on relators are able to re-litigate issues resolved in first-filed cases 
and capture crucial time in allegations that would be barred by the statute of limitations upon refiling); 
Beck, supra note 14, at 562 n.103 (discussing how the DOJ generally supported the 1986 amendments 
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viewed as potentially disruptive to its prosecution efforts); cf. Carter II, 135 S. Ct. at 1979 (discussing 
reluctance of defendants to settle a first-filed case when facing the prospect of later having to litigate 
the same allegations of fraud). See generally Elameto supra note 19, at 826–27 (discussing qui tam’s 
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Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 
965 (2007) (finding that low government intervention rates may signal that many private qui tam suits 
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 96 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a), (b)(2)(3), (c)(3) (requiring that DOJ investigate FCA violations, and 
setting a sixty-day period—subject to extension—in which the government may intervene); Chovanec 
II, 606 F.3d at 362–63 (describing procedural implications of dismissal and refiling). 
 97 Cf. United States ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 149 F.3d 227, 
234 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding that a broader definition of relatedness under first-to-file would block 
duplicative suits and incentivize swift reporting by relators because of the diminished prospects for 
follow-on actions and the corresponding increase in value of a first-filed case); United States ex rel. 
Batiste v. SLM Corp., 740 F. Supp. 2d 98, 105 n.3 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting first-to-file’s purpose of 
encouraging relators to expeditiously notify the government of fraud by precluding qui tam awards for 
latecomers), aff’d, 659 F.3d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Although a follow-on case could be barred by the 
statute of limitations because of the delay before refiling, a three-year tolling provision in the FCA 
helps to prevent this outcome. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b); see S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 15, as reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5280 (discussing tolling provision’s purpose of allowing FCA actions to 
proceed when fraud had been intentionally concealed from the government). If the government elects 
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files are to relate back to the original complaint, thereby insulating government intervention suits from 
the statute of limitations. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c). 
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CONCLUSION 
Once a qui tam action is barred by the FCA’s first-to-file rule, the plain 
terms of the rule prohibit that action from proceeding. In 2015, in United 
States ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit misconstrued first-to-file when it held that a follow-on relator 
could proceed by way of supplementation after a first-filed case had been dis-
missed. A statutorily-grounded approach incorporates the D.C. Circuit’s char-
acterization of first-to-file as nonjurisdictional and the Seventh Circuit’s refil-
ing requirement. This approach best effectuates the FCA’s purpose because it 
limits duplicative suits and promotes the resolution of cases likely to yield 
government recoveries. 
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